Profiling Technologies and Fundamental Rights. An Introduction by Bosco, Francesca et al.
Profiling Technologies in Practice
Applications and Impact on 
Fundamental Rights and Values
Edited by Niklas Creemers, Daniel Guagnin and Bert-Jaap Koops
With contributions by Francesca Bosco, Niklas Creemers, 
Elena D’Angelo, Valeria Ferraris, Daniel Guagnin, 
Mireille Hildebrandt, Bert-Jaap Koops, Bogdan Manolea,  
Arnold Roosendaal and Elise Vermeersch
a
Profiling Technologies in Practice
Applications and Impact on Fundamental Rights and Values
Edited by Niklas Creemers, Daniel Guagnin and Bert-Jaap Koops
With contributions by Francesca Bosco, Niklas Creemers, Elena D’Angelo, 
Valeria Ferraris, Daniel Guagnin, Mireille Hildebrandt, Bert-Jaap Koops, 
Bogdan Manolea, Arnold Roosendaal and Elise Vermeersch
ISBN: 9789462402416
Published by:
aolf Legal Publishers (WLP)
PO Box 313
5060 AH Oisterwijk
The Netherlands
E-Mail: info@wolfpublishers.nl
www.wolfpublishers.com
All URLS have been valid in time of printing, and no guarantee can be given that they will stay.
All rights reserved. No part of this publication may be reproduced, stored in a retrieval system, or 
transmitted in any form or by any means, electronic, mechanical, photocopying, recording or otherwise, 
without prior written permission of the publisher. Whilst the authors, editors and publisher have tried to 
ensure the accuracy of this publication, the publisher, authors and editors cannot accept responsibility for 
any errors, omissions, misstatements, or mistakes and accept no responsibility for the use of the information 
presented in this work.
 
© Author / WLP 2015
Table of Contents
Preface 1
Mireille Hildebrandt 
I. Profiling Technologies and Fundamental Rights. An Introduction 5
 Francesca Bosco, Niklas Creemers, Valeria Ferraris, Daniel Guagnin,  
 Bert-Jaap Koops and Elise Vermeersch  
II. National Data Protection Authorities’ views on profiling 21
 Francesca Bosco, Elena D’Angelo and Elise Vermeersch 
III.  E-commerce and profiling in Romania: 
 what is going on and who cares about privacy? 47
 Bogdan Manolea 
IV.  Border control: a new frontier for automated decision 
 making and profiling? 89
 Valeria Ferraris 
V.  Police work and databases: profiling political activism 127
 Niklas Creemers and Daniel Guagnin 
VI.  Innovation and Profiling: an Opportunity for Privacy 155
 Arnold Roosendaal 
Contributors 167
Profiling Technologies in PracTice
5
I. Profiling Technologies and Fundamental Rights.   
An Introduction
Francesca Bosco, Niklas Creemers, Valeria Ferraris, Daniel Guagnin, 
Bert-Jaap Koops and Elise Vermeersch1 
The global technological evolution of information and communication has 
modified the behaviour of citizens regarding their personal data and the use of this 
data by private companies and Public Authorities. Technological advancement 
has fuelled the digitalization of our societies. Infrastructure is increasingly based 
on digital devices and software. Today, mediated communication is mostly digital 
communication, making information easy to process and store as data. New 
potential for gathering data raises hopes for developing more advanced ways 
to manage societies. However, the availability of new sources of information 
requires the use of new and efficient analytical tools, able to collect, store and 
process huge amounts of data in order to extract usable information. These tools 
are typically utilized in technologies such as data mining2.
Profiling can be understood as a specific data mining method. In this perspective, 
profiling is regarded as a (semi-)automated process used to examine large data 
sets in order to build classes or categories of characteristics. These can be used to 
generate profiles of individuals, groups, places, events or whatever is of interest. 
Profiles structure data to discover patterns and probabilities. 
Using actuarial methods in this context is supposed to generate prognostic 
information to anticipate future trends and to forecast behaviour, processes 
and/or developments. The aim is to develop strategies in order to manage 
uncertainties of the future, while still in the present. In this regard, analytical tools, 
such as profiling, can be understood as important facilitators and elements of a 
preventive paradigm that can be found in diverse societal contexts (see Krasmann 
2010, O’Malley 1992). But these new data processing tools also result in the 
data subject’s loss of control over his/her personal data and over the decisions 
being made based on this information. Therefore, these new technologies also 
draw fears and scepticism as they impose threats on some of the core values 
1 This chapter is based on a previously published paper from Francesca Bosco, Niklas 
Creemers, Valeria Ferraris, Daniel Guagnin, and Bert-Jaap Koops. “Profiling Technologies 
and Fundamental Rights and Values: Regulatory Challenges and Perspectives from 
European Data Protection Authorities.” Dordrecht: Springer 2015.
2 Han and Kamber define data mining as “automated or convenient extraction of patterns 
representing knowledge implicitly stored or catchable in large databases, data warehouses, 
the Web, other massive information repositories or data streams” (Han and Kamber 2006, 
xxi).
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and principles of European societies. Key challenges that have been identified 
by scholars include the infringement of democratic principles and the rule of 
law: data gathering, exchange and processing potentially harm central values 
like individual autonomy and informational self-determination, as well as the 
fundamental rights to privacy, data protection, and non-discrimination.
Scholars are not alone in their concern for the risks related to the automated 
processing of data. A number of organisations, Institutes and Authorities (such as 
the European Parliament, the Council of Europe, the Article 29 Working Party, 
the national Data Protection Authorities and the European Data Protection 
Supervisor) regularly bring attention to the importance of respecting and 
reinforcing data protection, privacy rights and other fundamental rights in the 
context of technological evolution. 
This volume has been prepared within the framework of the project entitled 
PROFILING - Protecting Citizens’ Rights Fighting Illicit Profiling3, financed 
by the European Commission’s Directorate-General for Justice, under the 
Fundamental Rights and Citizenship programme. The project has been 
implemented by a consortium of five European partners, led by the United 
Nations Interregional Crime and Justice Research Institute (Turin, Italy), and 
including Amapola (Turin, Italy), the Romanian Centre for European Policies 
(Bucharest, Romania), the Technical University of Berlin (Berlin, Germany) 
and Tilburg University (Tilburg, The Netherlands). The project has focused on 
identifying and tackling the challenges posed by technology to the fundamental 
right to data protection. It was aimed at addressing some major issues, such as 
identifying the risks related to the extensive use of profiling, identifying the level 
of awareness of the responsible authorities of the Member States on the risks 
deriving from the use of profiling and assessing the countermeasures adopted 
in all EU Member States. As a first step, this introduction provides the working 
definition of profiling, as elaborated within the framework of the project, and 
tries to demonstrate how fundamental rights and values of European societies are 
endangered by the application of profiling in various contexts and the possible 
effects of the review of the current legal regulations.
Following this introduction, the volume contains two parts which are based 
on the project outcomes. The first one (chapter II) presents the results of a 
survey conducted with the 28 European National Data Protection Authorities 
regarding profiling issues. The questionnaire attempted to gain an overview of 
the profiling landscape in European Member States, including the current and 
future legal framework, the domains of application, the complaint and remedy 
procedures regarding the use of profiling techniques, the main risks and benefits 
for fundamental rights and citizens’ awareness on this topic.
3 More information available at: http://profiling-project.eu/ 
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The second part presents three fieldwork studies carried out in Romania, Italy 
and Germany. The first case study (chapter III) aims at identifying what are 
the current profiling practices and their respective privacy implications related 
to e-commerce in Romania. In particular, it investigates current practices and 
examines the vision of local actors concerning the process – both in technical and 
legal terms – while also trying to probe certain key-issues from a data protection 
point of view. The second case study (chapter IV), implemented in Italy, examines 
the involvement of automated decision making and profiling in border control. 
This study focuses its attention on the newly developed Schengen Information 
System II and on Eurodac, examining how these biometric databases are 
implemented and used in Italy for immigration control. Moreover, it explores 
development at European Union level in terms of new databases for migration 
control (the so called smart borders package) and the information exchange 
initiatives aimed at increasing surveillance in the Mediterranean area. The third 
case study (chapter V) investigates the collection, storage and evaluation of digital 
information by German police authorities, especially in their efforts to combat 
so-called political extremism and/or politically motivated crime. An analysis is 
also provided regarding how the use of digital information, databases and data 
analysis tools changes police practices and of the effects these changes have on 
civil rights as well as fundamental democratic values.
The final chapter discusses the mismatch between current data protection laws 
and profiling activities and the tension between potential benefits and threats 
in fundamental rights. Arnold Roosendaal argues that instead of regarding this 
as a dichotomy, it is key to think of innovative solutions in order to reduce the 
threats and enable privacy friendly services and technologies. Privacy could thus 
become a competitive argument.
This edition is intended both for presenting to the public the main results of 
the PROFILING project and for providing inputs to the various stakeholders 
involved in the field of automated profiling in order to expand the knowledge 
of this phenomenon and give useful information to policy-makers, governments 
and civil society.
1. Profiling: Finding a definition
The formation of a common definition for profiling has not yet been agreed 
upon. The term profiling, in itself, evokes a range of meanings, employed in 
both specialized and non-specialized scenarios. The issue of forming a definition 
of profiling represents a challenge for policy makers and socio-legal scholars, 
especially since current literature on the subject is technical rather than 
explanatory.
Gary T. Marx provided one of the oldest definitions of profiling in a paper that 
analyses systems of data searching. This definition refers almost exclusively to 
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profiling in the sector of law enforcement and states that profiling (as defined 
by the author in contrast to “matching”) is defined by stressing the logic behind 
it: “the logic of profiling is more indirect than that of matching. It follows an 
inductive logic in seeking clues that will increase the probability of discovering 
infractions relative to random searches. Profiling permits investigators to correlate 
a number of distinct data items in order to assess how close a person or event 
comes to a predetermined characterization or model of infraction” (Marx and 
Reichman 1984, 429). Roger Clarke, slightly less than a decade later, defined 
profiling as a “dataveillance technique (…) whereby a set of characteristics of a 
particular class of person is inferred from past experience, and data-holdings are 
then searched for individuals with a close fit to that set of characteristics” (Roger 
1993, 403). Lee A. Bygrave, remarked that: “profiling is the inference of a set of 
characteristics (profile) about an individual person or collective entity and the 
subsequent treatment of that person/entity or other persons/entities in the light 
of these characteristics” (Bygrave 2002, 301). Subsequently, Mireille Hildebrandt 
defined profiling as “the process of ‘discovering’ patterns in data in databases that 
can be used to identify or represent a human or nonhuman subject (individual or 
group) and/or the application of profiles (sets of correlated data) to individuate 
and represent an individual subject or to identify a subject as a member of a group 
(which can be an existing community or a discovered category)” (Hildebrandt 
2009a, 275). This has served as the main working definition of profiling and 
represents the best attempt at forming a universal definition of the term. Profiling 
allows for the visualization of patterns that are otherwise “invisible to the naked 
human eye” (Hildebrandt 2009c, 241). They are based on correlations found in 
data sets, and cannot be “equated with causes or reasons without further inquiry; 
they are probabilistic knowledge” (Gonzalez Fuster, Gutwirth and Ellyne 2010, 
2). Profiling represents a shift from the idea that knowledge is the result of 
tested hypotheses. It generates hypotheses: “The correlations as such become the 
‘pertinent’ information, triggering questions and suppositions” (Gonzalez Fuster, 
Gutwirth and Erika 2010, 2). With advancements in technology and the increased 
capacities of databases, profiling is able to bring forth new ways on generating 
and utilizing information. However, these advancements also create ramifications 
in the ever more complex profiling process, altering the role of human data 
controllers. Hildebrandt divides profiling into three categories: non-automated, 
automated and autonomic profiling. Non-automated profiling is a form of 
reasoning that does not rely on any process of automation. Automated profiling 
is based on “automated functions that collect and aggregate data” and develop 
it into “automation technologies that can move beyond advice on decision-
making, taking a load of low-level and even high-level decisions out of human 
hands” (Hildebrandt 2008, 28) Conversely, in autonomic profiling the role of 
the human is extremely minimal and the machine has control of the process of 
decision making (see Hildebrandt 2006 and 2008). Autonomic profiling “goes 
one step further than automated profiling” (Hildebrandt 2006, 550). Methods 
used in profiling can also be characterized by their objectives and application, 
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in addition to their level of automation. Profiling can be applied to both groups 
and individuals: the techniques that identify and represent groups can also focus 
on individuals (see Roosendaal 2013, Vedder 1999) Furthermore, profiling either 
relies on data collected from one single person or group in order to apply the 
information derived from data processing to the same person or group – direct 
profiling –, or it relies on categorization and generalisation from data collected 
among a large population to apply it to certain persons or groups – indirect 
profiling. Distributive group profiling and non-distributive group profiling 
are further classifications falling under the general category of group profiling 
(see Vedder 1999). Distributive group profiling identifies a certain number of 
people having the same attributes and characteristics. Non-distributive group 
profiling, on the other hand, identifies a number of people who do not share all 
of the characteristics of the group’s profile. The above-mentioned distinctions 
provide an idea as to the various categorizations of profiling and their respective 
applications. 
As regards a definition of profiling for the purposes of this book, we are utilizing 
the definition proposed within the framework of the PROFILING project, 
which specifically makes reference to the evolution of technology associated 
with profiling and to the purposes for employing the profiling process in society.
Profiling is a technique of (partly) automated processing of personal and/or non-
personal data, aimed at producing knowledge by inferring correlations from data in 
the form of profiles that can subsequently be applied as a basis for decision-making. 
A profile is a set of correlated data that represents a (individual or collective) subject. 
Constructing profiles is the process of discovering unknown patterns between data in 
large data sets that can be used to create profiles.
Applying profiles is the process of identifying and representing a specific individual 
or group as fitting a profile and of taking some form of decision based on this 
identification and representation.
2. The Threat of Profiling for Fundamental Rights and Values
The creation of knowledge represents the core of the profiling process as it allows 
the anticipation of future trends and the prognostication of behaviour, processes 
or developments. Proponents of profiling tout its potential for gathering data 
and conducting analysis, claiming that the limited reliability of data mining will 
improve as technological capabilities increase and eventually organizations will be 
able to address negative developments in a pre-emptive manner. Early detection 
of tax fraud and pandemics are examples of issues that could be addressed through 
the use of big data analytics. At the same time, fundamental rights such as the rights 
to privacy, data protection, and non-discrimination, among others, could be put at 
risk through profiling and its associated practices. The threat of infringement on 
these rights is growing as the use profiling expands throughout the world.
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2.1 Fundamental Values
Liberal democracy (see Zakaria 1997) and profiling are at odds with one another 
due to their inherent characteristics. Profiling is considered a glamour technology: 
it gives the idea that human beings can attain unforeseeable knowledge that 
allows for the making of better decisions. But the dark side of profiling is that 
it makes “invisible all what cannot be translated into machine-readable data” 
(Gutwirth and Hildebrandt 2010, 33). Due to the complexity of the applied 
algorithms present within automated profiling, human beings cannot properly 
intervene and repair the bias consequently created by the machine not being able 
to read certain data. As a result, “as far as the governance of people and things 
becomes dependent on these advanced profiling technologies, new risks will 
emerge in the shadow of the real time models and simulations these technologies 
make possible. What has been made invisible can grow like weeds” (Gutwirth 
and Hildebrandt 2010, 33). By not considering some aspects of an issue profiling 
can lead to the making of ineffective and wrong decisions, or, in severe cases, 
result in serious risks and damages for a population. Human intervention is not 
the only aspect that is reduced during the decision-making process. Citizens 
have hardly any access to the process of constructing and applying of profiles. 
The resulting unbalanced distribution of power is detrimental to the workings of 
a liberal democracy (see Solove 2004) and to balancing knowledge asymmetries 
(see Gutwirth and Hildebrandt 2010) between citizens and the government. 
Knowledge asymmetries are not uncommon, but profiling technologies have the 
capacity to push them to a new high. In most cases, citizens are neither aware of the 
information in circulation, nor in the ways in which it can be utilized in the future. 
This is particularly the case when profiles are constructed from data that is not of 
the data subject’s own, leading to the information being used to take decisions 
about the subjects without their involvement. There is no simple solution for 
data protection in the foreseeable future, and this issue is being exacerbated via 
some sophisticated profiling technologies like Behavioural Biometric Profiling 
(BBP), which “do not require identification at all” (Hildebrandt 2009c, 243).
If the position that citizens enjoy vis-à-vis the state is one of the indicators of 
the quality of a liberal democracy, the governmental use of profiling techniques 
seriously challenges some essential democratic features. This not only relates to 
the recognition of rights by the state, but also to the opportunities these rights 
entail for the full and free development and expression of citizens’ personalities 
and their effective participation in democratic life. In this framework are 
placed the fundamental values of autonomy and self-determination. Against 
the backdrop of the discussion about profiling, self-determination acquires the 
specific meaning of informational self-determination, which means that an 
individual needs to have control over the data and information produced by and 
on him/her. This control is “a precondition for him/her to live an existence that 
may be said ‘self-determined” (Rouvroy and Poullet 2009, 51). As previously 
mentioned, digitization of everyday life has led to opaque ways of data gathering, 
exchange and processing. Technologies like profiling do not leave much space for 
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autonomy and self-determination (see Hildebrandt 2009c). The use of profiling 
in the field of healthcare can be helpful and harmful at the same time. E-health 
and m-health (electronic health and mobile health) technology allow for the 
around-the-clock monitoring of factors, such as a person’s diet, activities, medical 
treatment, condition of physical maladies, etc., paving the way for a revolution 
in the areas of disease control, treatment, finding cures, and more. There is also 
the potential for gathering multi-source information about patients’ that could 
be used in conducting an actuarial assessment of lifestyles in order to build risk 
categories that are not only used for “individualised” treatments, but also for 
developing “individual” insurance fees or other incentives to make clients adapt 
to certain lifestyles. However, the categories created through profiling are not 
individualized in the least, being derived from abstract calculations conducted 
on the premise of profit maximization. This economic logic is transferred to 
individual lifestyle choices by rewarding behaviours assessed as low risk or healthy, 
while penalizing the ones that are considered high risk for accidents or diseases. 
Although profiling in this context is supposed to empower healthy lifestyles, it 
also undermines individuals’ autonomy, and it facilitates the economisation of 
everyday life by addressing individuals, not as individuals but as bundles of risks 
and behavioural probabilities, effectively reducing them to profiles (see Deleuze 
1992). E-health is only one example of an area in which this logic is executed. 
Risk factors or behavioural probabilities, which are identified and addressed, 
vary contextually as aims and scopes of profiling agents differ. “Although we 
are constantly being monitored in some way or another we do not live in an 
Orwellian ‘Big Brother’ dystopia. […] Rather, an intricate network of small 
surveillance societies exists, often overlapping, connectable or connected, but 
each with their own features and rules” (Koops 2009, 104). The narrative linking 
these small surveillance societies involves the creation of knowledge taken from 
certain populations, which has the power to influence and steer individuals, 
groups, and social processes. This facilitates an environment where informational 
self-determination and autonomy are jeopardised for the idea of an advanced 
control over social developments. 
2.2 Fundamental Rights
The fundamental values presented earlier on are very much interrelated with 
the rights to privacy, data protection and the protection from discrimination. As 
highlighted by Rodotà, “the strong protection of personal data continues to be a 
‘necessary utopia’ if one wishes to safeguard the democratic nature of our political 
systems” (Rodotà 2009, 78) As Rouvroy and Poullet point out, data protection is 
vital in sustaining a vivid democracy. The right to non-discrimination is equally 
important (see Rouvroy and Poullet 2009, 57) and it is not by chance that in two 
recent profiling-related cases, the European Court of Justice invoked legislation 
on both Data Protection and anti-discrimination in order to protect citizens’ 
rights.
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2.2.1 The Rights to Privacy and Data Protection
Without attempting to define the various notions of privacy (see Solove 2007), 
it is beneficial to re-examine how privacy and data protection interact with 
one another. Following Gellert and Gutwirth, most privacy definitions can be 
summarized as either the problem of being left alone, or the question of how to 
cope with information stemming from social interaction in a way that certain 
areas of one’s personal life are hidden from undesired exposure (see Gellert and 
Gutwirth 2012). Data protection law, however, is created to ensure the safety of 
personal data while also facilitating the free flow of information. In this scenario, 
privacy is a rather vague issue. While data protection is related to transparency (see 
Gellert and Gutwirth 2012), privacy is broader in the sense that privacy covers 
more than just personal data, and the misuse of personal data can affect more than 
someone’s privacy. As previously mentioned, modern technology has the capacity 
to create digitalized data that can be used in automated processing and, therefore, 
profiling challenges the concepts of privacy and data protection. As technologies 
develop, these concepts have to evolve and catch up with an environment of 
constant progress in which: “its content varies from the circumstances, the people 
concerned and the values of the society or the community” (Trudel 2009, 322). 
Profiling technologies, as shown in this book, lead to more black boxing and 
more obscurity related to data processing. It is actually questionable as to how 
the factual use of data can be made transparent. In order to build an exhaustive 
framework representing threats to the right to privacy and the right to data 
protection, the OECD Privacy Principles4 are regarded as terms of reference and 
as one of the most comprehensive and commonly used privacy frameworks.5The 
principles include (1) Collection Limitation Principle: data should be obtained by 
lawful and fair means and with the knowledge or consent of the data subject; (2) 
Data Quality Principle: data which are to be used, should be accurate, complete 
and kept up-to-date; (3) Purpose Specification and (4) Limitation Principle: The 
purposes for data collected should be specified only be used for the specified 
purposes; (5) Security Safeguards Principle: Personal data should be protected by 
reasonable security safeguards; (6) Openness Principle: There should be a general 
policy of openness about developments, practices and policies with respect to 
4 The Privacy Principles are contained in the OECD Guidelines on the protection of 
privacy and transborder flows of personal data. In 2013 these Guidelines have been 
updated; the original version, developed in the late 1970s and adopted in 1980, was the 
first internationally agreed upon set of privacy principles. See OECD (2014) “Guidelines 
on the Protection of Privacy and Transborder Flows of Personal Data”.
5 The basic data protection principles largely overlaps with the principles outlined in the 
Council of Europe’s (1982) Convention 108 for the Protection of Individuals with Regard 
to Automatic Processing of Personal and the Directive 95/46/EC on the Protection 
of Personal Data, however the OECD Guidelines already included the principle of 
accountability which has been prominently resumed in the Article 29 Working Party’s 
(2010) Opinion on the Principle of Accountability.
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personal data. (7) Individual Participation Principle: Individuals should have the 
right: a) to obtain the data stored relating to them; b) to be informed about data 
relating to them c) to be given reasons if a request made under subparagraphs 
(a) and (b) is denied, and to be able to challenge such denial; and d) to challenge 
data relating to them and, if the challenge is successful to have the data erased, 
rectified, completed or amended. (8) Accountability Principle: A data controller 
should be accountable for complying with measures, which give effect to the 
principles stated above.6
RFID-enabled travel cards (as used in many metropolises, e.g. Oyster Card in 
London and Octopus Card in Hong Kong) can serve as an example for displaying 
how new technologies challenge the right to privacy and data protection. The 
cards contain personal information about their individual holders, so as not 
to be abused by others. Going a step further, the RFID chips can be used to 
generate sophisticated traveller, profiles7 and even consumer profiles in cities 
where the cards can also be used to pay in shops. For the issue of traveller profiles, 
these could be used to track suspicious travel patterns, revealing potentially 
deviant behaviour (e.g. people using uncommon routes and combinations 
stations when taking the subway, indicating activities ranging from drug dealing 
to infidelity. This exemplifies the fear that data which is not conceived as 
sensitive or potentially harmful could become so through combinations with 
other data.8 Even anonymous or de-identified data can be used to generate 
outcomes ranging from privacy infringement to discrimination. Furthermore, 
the effectiveness of such approaches is doubted by scholars. Big Data analytics 
allow for the extraction of unpredictable inferences from data, putting at risk and 
undermining de-identification strategies. This is due to the risk of reconstructing 
real identities when combining anonymized data identities in the profiling 
process (see Ohm 2010, 1701). New technologies, such as RFID-chips, make it 
difficult to follow which information is collected for which purposes and to keep 
track of the factual use of such data. It is tempting for the human data controllers 
to push the envelope when it comes to utilizing data in new ways, attempting to 
generate higher levels of knowledge. For the average person, becoming aware of 
unspecified data usage is a challenge. There are a host of practical complications 
for implementing sound data protection through the enacting of accountability, 
6 Data protection accountability has recently been debated among privacy scholars (see 
Guagnin et al. 2012) and is taken into account in the discussions of the current draft of 
the GDPR. 
7 Some RFID chips which use unique identifiers for initializing connections to RFID readers 
can also be tracked by third parties through this unique ID without any need to establish 
an authorized connection with the chip. See for instance http://www.spiegel.de/netzwelt/
netzpolitik/sparkassen-pilotprojekt-kontaktlose-geldkarte-verraet-ihren-besitzer-a-831711.html
8 For a problematisation of inferring private data from large databases and efforts to avoid 
disclosure of private data see Chang and Moskowitz 2001; Sackmann, Strüker and Accorsi 
2006; Verykios et al. 2004.
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transparency, and traceability measures.9 Currently, there is a general lack of 
transparency in profiling techniques (see Hildebrandt 2009a and 2009b) and data 
processors’ accountability is challenged by the employment of vague practices 
and the black boxed technologies inherent to data mining and profiling. Within 
this environment, neither the Security Safeguards Principle nor the Openness 
Principle is being taken into consideration. Individuals become increasingly 
more transparent in this setting, just as public bodies and even private companies 
become more intrusive, operating along the fringe of legality. 
2.2.2 The Right to Non-Discrimination
The right to non-discrimination “emanates from the general postulate of 
the equal dignity of human beings”. (Özden 2011, 7) This right constitutes a 
general principle in EU Law and has been enshrined as a fundamental right 
in Article 21 of the EU Charter of fundamental rights. It consists of a general 
principle of equality (i.e. similar situations have to be treated in the same way and 
different situations have to be treated differently) and contains specific provisions 
developed in anti-discrimination legislation related to certain protected grounds 
(e.g. age, race, gender, religion, sexual orientation, etc.) and specific areas of 
application (i.e. labour market, vocational training, education, social security, 
health care, access to goods and services, criminal law).Within the canon of EU 
law, there is a conceptual distinction between direct and indirect discrimination, 
both of which are prohibited. Direct discrimination occurs when a person is 
treated less favourably than another, and this difference is based directly on the 
protected grounds previously mentioned. Indirect discrimination occurs when 
apparently neutral criteria, practices or procedures have a discriminating effect 
on people from a particular protected group. This distinction is highly relevant in 
the context of profiling because rarely does the classification and categorization 
made by profiling techniques occur directly on forbidden grounds. Frequently, 
the categorization is based on algorithms used to classify some attributes that 
can result as proxies of a protected ground. As stated by Romei and Ruggieri 
“the naive approach of deleting attributes that denote protected groups from the 
original dataset does not prevent a classifier to indirectly learn discriminatory 
decisions, since other attributes strongly correlated with them could be used as 
a proxy by the model extraction algorithm” (Romei and Ruggieri 2013, 121). 
The best-known example of this relates to “redlining”, a practice that is explicitly 
forbidden by US law. Redlining is the practice of denying products and services 
9 Some scholars criticise that accountability could become just another ineffective 
bureaucratic measure, yet other scholars see potential of achieving stronger communication 
about data processing practices and verifiable accounts of data processors. The impact 
and effectiveness of accountability will depend on the actual implementation and the 
adoption by data processors. A number of contributions to the debate of the principle of 
accountability can be found in Guagnin et al. 2012.
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in particular neighbourhoods, marked with a red line on a map. Due to racial, 
ethnic or social segregation an apparently neutral attribute such as ZIP Code may 
turn into a qualifier for indirect discrimination. In most circumstances, profiling, 
as it is applied to marketing (web marketing, loan market, price determination, 
etc.), can easily hide practices of indirect discrimination. Consequently, research 
on data mining techniques that prevent discrimination is a fruitful field of study 
(see Pedreschi, Ruggieri and Turini 2013). Another example of infringement 
on the right to non-discrimination is that of Eurosur, a European approach 
to smart border surveillance. This system relies on technology to automatically 
check passengers crossing a border. Its use of technology consists of databases and 
sophisticated tools, such as body and iris scanners. Eurosur’s final aim is to speed 
up the border crossing process for bona fide travellers, fight illegal migration and 
enhance security. The proposed databases (Passenger Name Record, Registered 
Traveller Programme, Entry/Exit System) rely on an extensive collection of 
personal and non-personal data in order to distinguish between welcome and 
unwelcome travellers. Aside from the privacy risks, data protection issues due to 
the use of biometrics, and the lack of respect for the principle of purpose-binding 
and use limitation. The ambiguousness of the logic behind the data mining 
procedure is in itself hard to reconcile with the obligation not to discriminate 
on prohibited grounds. However, above all, the smart borders approach raises 
huge concerns about the respect for human dignity.
The multitude of risks that profiling imposes on fundamental rights and values, 
as well as the complex effects related to the implementation of this technology, 
reveal just how challenging it is to impose adequate measures for the protection 
of European rights and values. The next section provides a brief overview of the 
state of this process in Europe.
3. Regulating profiling - an outlook
The word profiling does not appear in current EU data protection legislation. 
However article 15 of Directive 95/46/EC (henceforth, Data Protection 
Directive, DPD) addresses ‘automated individual decisions’ and is therefore 
closely related to profiling. According to article 15(1): “every person has the 
right not to be subject to a decision which produces legal effects concerning him 
or significantly affects him and which is based solely on automated processing 
of data intended to evaluate certain personal aspects relating to him, such as 
his performance at work, creditworthiness, reliability, conduct, etc.” At the same 
time, article 15 (2) states an exception: “a person may nevertheless be subjected 
to an automated individual decision if that decision is taken: (a) in the course 
of the entering into or performance of a contract, provided the request for the 
entering into or the performance of the contract, lodged by the data subject, 
has been satisfied or that there are suitable measures to safeguard his legitimate 
interests, such as arrangements allowing him to put his point of view; or (b) is 
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authorized by a law which also lays down measures to safeguard the data subject’s 
legitimate interests”.
In light of Article 15 of the DPD, it is relevant whether or not processing is 
meant to evaluate a certain aspect of a person’s behaviour, character or identity 
on which a decision can be based. A decision based on a profile can comply with 
the law, but a real person must be involved in the process. In short, Article 15 
is not a direct prohibition on a particular type of decision-making; but rather, 
it directs each EU Member State to confer on persons a right preventing them 
from being regularly subjected to purely automated decisions (see Bygrave 
2002, 3). The DPD has been unable to provide sufficient protection in our fast-
developing information society. In January 2012, a draft General Data Protection 
Regulation (GDPR) and a Data Protection Directive, developed for the context 
of law enforcement, were released by the European Commission in an attempt 
to respond to the technological developments of recent decades.
Article no. 20 of the GDPR concerns a data subject’s right not to be subjected 
to a measure based on profiling. This article is representative of an evolution 
with respect to Article 15(1). It implements modifications and safeguards and 
takes into consideration the Council of Europe’s recommendation on profiling 
(Recommendation CM/Rec(2010)13). Compared with Article 15, Article 20 
better defines the right of a person not to be subjected to a measure that is 
based solely on automated processing10 and, in particular, elucidates the principle 
that profiling cannot be based only on sensitive forms of data (e.g. race or 
ethnic origin, religion, political opinion or sexual orientation), which would 
carry too strong a risk for discrimination on the basis of a prohibited grounds11. 
Article 20, in comparison with Article 15, places more stringent rules on the 
application of profiling allowing the practice only when: a) it is required for 
contracts, and the data subject has the right to request a human intervention; 
b) it is permitted by law; or 3) under certain conditions, the data subject gives a 
free, explicit and informed consent12. A unique aspect of Article 20 concerns the 
10 Article 20 par. 1: “Every natural person shall have the right not to be subject to a measure 
which produces legal effects concerning this natural person or significantly affects this 
natural person, and which is based solely on automated processing intended to evaluate 
certain personal aspects relating to this natural person or to analyse or predict in particular 
the natural person’s performance at work, economic situation, location, health, personal 
preferences, reliability or behaviour.”
11 Article 20 par. 3: “Automated processing of personal data intended to evaluate certain 
personal aspects relating to a natural person shall not be based solely on the special 
categories of personal data referred to in Article 9”.
12 Article 20 par. 2: “Subject to the other provisions of this Regulation, a person may be 
subjected to a measure of the kind referred to in paragraph 1 only if the processing: (a) 
is carried out in the course of the entering into, or performance of, a contract, where 
the request for the entering into or the performance of the contract, lodged by the 
data subject, has been satisfied or where suitable measures to safeguard the data subject’s 
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provision contained in the fourth paragraph, obliging data controllers to provide 
‘information as to the existence of processing” for an automated decision and 
information pertaining to “the envisaged effects of such processing on the data 
subject”.13 As highlighted by the advice paper released by Article 29 WP in May 
201314, there is no definition of profiling included in the GDPR. The existence 
of blank spots such as this is a testament to the fact that there is still a lot of work 
to be done in understanding the scope of profiling and facilitating the formation 
of adequate regulation in this rapidly expanding field.
References
Article 29 Working Party. 2010. Opinion on the Principle of Accountability in 2010. 
Accessed 8 May, 2015. http://ec.europa.eu/justice/policies/privacy/docs/
wpdocs/2010/wp173_en.pdf.
Bosco, Francesca, Niklas Creemers, Valeria Ferraris, Daniel Guagnin and Bert-
Jaap Koops. 2015. “Profiling Technologies and Fundamental Rights and Values: 
Regulatory Challenges and Perspectives from European Data Protection 
Authorities.” In Reforming European Data Protection Law, edited by Serge Gutwirth, 
Ronald Leenes, and Paul de Hert. Dordrecht: Springer.
Bygrave, Lee A. 2002. Data protection law: Approaching its rationale, logic and limits. 
The Hague: Kluwer Law International, 2002.
Council of Europe. 1981. “Convention for the Protection of Individuals with 
Regard to Automatic Processing of Personal Data”, Convention 108. Accessed 
8 May, 2015. http://www.conventions.coe.int/Treaty/en/Treaties/Html/108.
htm.
Chang, Li Wu and Ira S. Moskowitz. 2001. “An Integrated Framework for 
Database Privacy Protection.“ In Data and Application Security, edited by Bhavani 
Thuraisingham et al., 161-172. New York: Springer.
Clarke, Roger. 1993. “Profiling: A Hidden Challenge to the Regulation of Data 
Surveillance,” Journal of Law and Information Science 4, 2: p. 403.
legitimate interests have been adduced, such as the right to obtain human intervention; 
or (b) is expressly authorized by a Union or Member State law which also lays down 
suitable measures to safeguard the data subject’s legitimate interests; or (c) is based on the 
data subject’s consent, subject to the conditions laid down in Article 7 and to suitable 
safeguards.”
13 See for weaknesses and strengths of this provision Koops 2013 and Hildebrandt 2012.
14 Advice paper on essential elements of a definition and a provision on profiling within the 
EU General Data Protection Regulation http://ec.europa.eu/justice/data-protection/
article-29/documentation/other-document/files/2013/20130513_advice-paper-on-
profiling_en.pdf
I. ProfIlIng TechnologIes and fundamenTal rIghTs.  an InTroducTIon 
18
Deleuze, Gilles. 1992. “Postskriptum über die Kontrollgesellschaften,“ In 
Unterhandlungen 1972-1990, Gilles Deleuze, 254-262. Frankfurt a.M.: Suhrkamp.
Directive 95/46/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 24 
October 1995 on the protection of individuals with regard to the processing 
of personal data and on the free movement of such data, Official Journal L 281, 
23/11/1995, p. 0031 – 0050. Accessed 08 May, 2015. http://eur-lex.europa.eu/
LexUriServ/LexUriServ.do?uri=CELEX:31995L0046:en:HTML. 
Finn, Rachel L., David Wright and Michael Friedewald. 2013. “Seven Types of 
Privacy.” In European Data Protection: Coming of Age, edited by Serge Gutwirth, 
Ronald Leenes, Paul de Hert and Yves Poullet, 3-32. Dordrecht: Springer, 2013.
Gellert, Raphael and Serge Gutwirth. 2012. “Beyond accountability, the return 
to privacy?” In Managing Privacy through Accountability, edited by Daniel Guagnin, 
Leon Hempel, Carla Ilten, Inga Kröger, Daniel Neyland and Hector Postigo, 
261-284. Houndmills: Palgrave Macmillan.
González Fuster, Gloria, Serge Gutwirth and Erika Ellyne. “Profiling in the 
European Union: A high-risk practice,” in INEX Policy Brief 10 (2010): 1-12.
Guagnin, Daniel, Leon Hempel, Carla Ilten, Inga Kröner, Daniel Neyland and 
Hector Postigo (eds.), 2012. Managing Privacy Through Accountability. Houndmills: 
Palgrave.
Gutwirth, Serge and Mireille Hildebrandt. 2010. “Some Caveats on Profiling,” In 
Data protection in a profiled world, edited by Serge Gutwirth, Yves Poullet and Paul 
de Hert, 31-41. Dordrecht: Springer.
Han, Jiawei and Micheline Kamber. 2006. Data Mining: Concepts and Techniques. 
Oxford: Elsevier Ltd.
Hildebrandt, Mireille. 2006. “Profiling: from Data to Knowledge. The challenges 
of a crucial technology.” DuD Datenschutz und Datensicherheit 30(9): 548 – 552.
Hildebrandt, Mireille. 2008. “Defining profiling: a new type of knowledge?” In 
Profiling the European Citizens. Cross-Disciplinary Perspectives, edited by Mireille 
Hildebrandt and Serge Gutwirth, 17-47. Dordrecht: Springer.
Hildebrandt, Mireille. 2009a. “Profiling and AML,” In The Future of Identity in the 
Information Society. Challenges and Opportunities, edited by Kai Rannenberg, Denis 
Royer and Andre Deuker, 273-310. Heidelberg: Springer.
Hildebrandt, Mireille. 2009b. “Technology and the End of Law.” In Facing the 
Limits of the Law, edited by Erik Claes, Wouter Devroe and Bert Keirsbilck, 
443–465.  Heidelberg: Springer.
Profiling Technologies in PracTice
19
Hildebrandt, Mireille. 2009c. “Who is Profiling Who? Invisible Visibility.” In 
Reinventing Data Protection?, edited by Serge Gutwirth, Yves Poullet, Paul de 
Hert, Cecile Terwagne and Sjaak Nouwt, 239-252. Dordrecht: Springer.
Koops, Bert-Jaap. 2009. “Technology and the Crime Society: Rethinking Legal 
Protection,” Law, Innovation & Technology 1, 1: 93-124.
Krasmann, Susanne. 2010. “Der Präventionsstaat im Einvernehmen. 
Wie Sichtbarkeitsregime stillschweigend Akzeptanz produzieren.“ In 
Sichtbarkeitsregime: Überwachung, Sicherheit und Privatheit im 21. Jahrhundert, edited 
by Leon Hempel, Susanne Krasmann and Ulrich Bröckling, 53-70. Wiesbaden: VS 
Verlag.
Marx, Gary and Nancy Reichman. 1984. “Routinizing the Discovery of Secrets: 
Computers as Informants,” American Behavioral Scientis, 27, 4: 423-453.
OECD 2014. Guidelines on the Protection of Privacy and Transborder Flows of 
Personal Data. Accessed 14 March, 2014. http://www.oecd.org/sti/ieconomy/
oecdguidelinesontheprotectionofprivacyandtransborderflowsofpersonaldata.
htm.
Ohm, Paul. 2010. “Broken Promises of Privacy: Responding to the Surprising 
Failure of Anonymization.” UCLA Law Review Vol. 57: 1701. 
O‘Malley, Pat. 1992. “Risk, power and crime prevention,” Economy and Society 
21/3: 252-275.
Özden, Melik. 2011. “The Right to non-discrimination.” Series of the Human 
Rights Programme of the CETIM.
Pedreschi, Dino, Salvatore Ruggieri and Franco Turini. 2013. “The Discovery 
of Discrimination,” In Discrimination and Privacy in the Information Society. Data 
Mining and Profiling in Large Databases, edited by Bart Custers, Toon Calders, Bart 
Schermer and Tal Zarsky, 91-108. Berlin: Springer.
Rodotà, Stefano. 2009. “Data Protection as a Fundamental Right.” In Reinventing 
Data Protection?, edited by Serge Gutwirth, Yves Poullet, Paul de Hert, Cecile 
Terwagne and Sjaak Nouwt, 77-82. Dordrecht: Springer.
Romei, Andrea and Salvatore Ruggieri. 2013. “Discrimination Data Analysis: A 
Multi-disciplinary Bibliography.” In Discrimination and Privacy in the Information 
Society. Data Mining and Profiling in Large Databases, edited by Bart Custers, Toon 
Calders, Bart Schermer and Tal Zarsky, 109-135. Berlin: Springer.
Roosendaal, Arnold. 2013. Digital Personae and Profiles in Law. Protecting Individuals’ 
Rights in Online Contexts. Oisterwijk: Wolf Legal Publishers.
I. ProfIlIng TechnologIes and fundamenTal rIghTs.  an InTroducTIon 
20
Rouvroy, Antoinette and Poullet, Yves. 2009. “The right to informational self-
determination and the value of self-development. Reassessing the importance 
of privacy for democracy.“ In Reinventing Data Protection?, edited by Serge 
Gutwirth, Yves Poullet, Paul de Hert, Cecile Terwagne and Sjaak Nouwt, 45-67. 
Dordrecht: Springer.
Sackmann, Stefan, Jens Strüker and Rafael Accorsi, 2006. “Personalization in 
Privacy-aware Highly Dynamic Systems.“ Communications of the ACM - Privacy 
and security in highly dynamic systems. 49, 9: 32-38.
Solove, Daniel J.. 2004. Digital Person: Technology and Privacy in the Information Age. 
New York: New York University Press.
Trudel, Pierre. 2009. “Privacy Protection on the Internet: Risk Management 
and Networked Normativity,” In Reinventing Data Protection?, edited by Serge 
Gutwirth et al., 317-334. Dordrecht: Springer.
Vedder, Anton. 1999. “KDD: The challenge to individualism,” Ethics and 
Information Technology: 275-281.
Verykios, Vassilios S. et al. 2004. “State-of-the-art in Privacy Preserving Data 
Mining.“ SIGMOD Rec. 33, 1: 50–57.
Zakaria, Fareed. 1997. “The rise of illiberal democracy.” Foreign Affairs 76, 6: 22-
43.
